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FROM GO TO WOE: HOW A NOT-FOR-PROFIT MANAGED THE CHANGE TO 
ACCRUAL ACCOUNTING  
Abstract 
Purpose 
The paper examines the process of change in an Australian not-for-profit organization, from a 
cash-based to an accrual-based accounting system.  Its particular focus is the relationship 
between the image portrayed by accrual accounting adoption and the technical realities of the 
new system.  
Design/methodology/approach. 
Data was gathered from interviews, documents and meetings, and was contextualized and 
interpreted using institutional theory.  
Findings 
The decision to change to accrual accounting was made at the top of the organizational 
hierarchy in response to institutional pressure to present a corporate image. The 
implementation of the new system was poorly conceived, inadequately resourced, and 
hampered by an authoritarian structure that effectively ignored the technical incompetence 
and training needs of many accounting staff. This resulted in an accounting system half way 
between cash and accrual, and very different from the system as it had been promoted. The 
process caused conflict at all levels of the organizational hierarchy. 
Research limitations/implications 
Accounting in not-for-profit organizations is an under-researched area offering potential for 
fruitful research in a changing institutional landscape. This institutional approach, while 
offering just one interpretation of the qualitative data gathered in this project, provides 
valuable insights about the process of change.  
Practical implications 
Not-for-profit organizations play a vital economic and social role, and need carefully to 
assess their responses to ongoing institutional pressures. In implementing change, they face 
the challenge of balancing the promotion of an institutionally acceptable image and the need 
for technical efficiencies.  
Originality/value 
The examination of change in an organization provides a rich context for the exploration of 
the dynamic, problematic process by which a new accounting practice is embedded and 
institutionalized.  
Keywords: institutional theory, not-for-profit organizations, accrual accounting, change 
process, qualitative research 
Paper type: Research paper 
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FROM GO TO WOE: HOW A NOT-FOR-PROFIT ORGANIZATION MANAGED 
THE CHANGE TO ACCRUAL ACCOUNTING  
1. Introduction 
The not-for-profit sector1 has undergone significant changes in the last two decades 
(Tuckman, 1998; Alexander, 2000; Georke, 2003; Jegers and Lapsley, 2003). In response to 
institutional pressures that have emanated from the private sector, and have been funnelled 
through the new public management practices of the public sector (Broadbent and Laughlin, 
1998; Pilcher, 2005; Hoque, 2005; Llewellyn and Milne, 2007; Rautiainen, 2008), not-for-
profits have now moved to a more corporate, competitive, professional mode of operations 
(Lyons, 1997; Alexander and Weiner, 1998; Irvine, 2000; Myers and Sacks, 2003; Dart, 
2004). This transition has necessitated the adoption and embedding of institutionally 
acceptable practices at organizational level. New accounting and financial reporting systems, 
including accrual accounting, represent a significant component of these changes (Torres and 
Pina, 2003; Vakkuri, 2003; Flack and Ryan, 2005; West and Carnegie, 2010).  
Organizational change has been studied in several modes2 across a plethora of discipline 
areas3, and has been theorized using a variety of lenses, including institutional theory 
(Brignall and Modell, 2000; Burns, 2000; Burns and Scapens, 2000; Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 
2005; Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006; Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005). This qualitative study 
examines the process of change in Hearts & Hands,4 an Australian not-for-profit 
religious/charitable organization that replaced its cash-based accounting system with an 
accrual-based system in the mid 1990s. The study draws on a contextualized and expanded 
institutional perspective (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Burns, 2000; Burns and Scapens, 2000). 
This acknowledges both the image benefits enjoyed by organizations that adopt 
institutionally desirable practices such as accrual accounting and their technical requirements. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between the image portrayed by an 
accrual accounting system and the technical realities of its adoption.  
Data was gathered over a twelve-month period during 1996-1997, from observations, over 
100 interviews, notes of meetings attended both at head office and divisional level, 
documentation from the organization's finance department, and historic archival material. 
Interviews were transcribed, presented to interviewees for signature as a correct record, and 
then, together with other data sources (documents, diaries, minutes and notes of meetings) 
were analysed using a computerized qualitative data management package. This analysis was 
conducted not only to capture a detailed appreciation of the way the organization actually 
operated and the way the change was managed, but to take into account the institutional 
environment in which Hearts & Hands operated, its own unique organizational features and 
its response to that environment in the process of its adoption of accrual accounting. 
Hearts & Hands is introduced in the next section of the paper, together with a snapshot of the 
institutional environment in which it operates. An expanded institutional framework is then 
developed. Through this framework, the process by which accrual accounting adoption was 
decided upon, then encoded, enacted, reproduced and institutionalized within Hearts & Hands 
is described and analyzed. The conclusion offers suggestions for further research. 
2. The organization: structure, culture, and accounting  
Hearts & Hands is an iconic organization with a distinctive history and culture, and a 
significant economic as well as social impact on the Australian community. It is not-for-
profit, religious (Christian), social services (charitable) organization, an employer, a 
successful fundraiser and part of an international organization5. While it is one single legal 
4 
 
entity, required to separate social services activities from its religious work, it actually 
operates as several separate "quasi" entities. It provides an extensive network of aged care 
services, employment and training services, services to the homeless, drug rehabilitation, the 
sale of donated second hand goods and farm produce, missionary work, educational 
institutions, and a church network and related ministries.  
The organizational structure of Hearts & Hands is portrayed in Figure 1. The Divisional Head 
Office that is the focus of this study is one of two Australian divisions that answer to the 
International Office. At the time of the study, the division studied consisted of eight sub-
divisions, seven geographical and one functional. Within the seven geographical sub-
divisions were 170 churches, 67 social centres and 135 community centres. The functional 
sub-division oversaw 13 rehabilitation centres and various industrial premises and local 
stores.  
Figure 1. Hearts & Hands’ organizational structure 
At the Hearts & Hands Divisional Head Office, the Divisional Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) was at the top of the structure, with a Divisional Deputy CEO and Personnel, Business 
Administration (including finance and audit departments), Program and Women’s 
Departments. These departments were usually headed by a Secretary, and in the case of 
Business Administration, this was Joe. Working alongside the CEO was a Divisional External 
Advisory Board comprised of business and professional leaders. These friends of Hearts & 
Hands were, in many cases, high profile professionals from industry and the media, who 
volunteered their expertise and provided valuable connections that assisted the organization 
with advice about a range of topics including publicity, fundraising, management and 
accounting. They ensured the organization was aware of current business practice. The 
Finance Department consisted of five ordained people (i.e. full time religious workers) and 
twenty-one employees. The Secretary of Finance was Barry. He was an ordained man who 
was, most unusually for Hearts & Hands, a former Chartered Accountant. The Chief 
Accountant, Stuart, was an employee, a qualified practising accountant, with no other 
affiliation with Hearts & Hands. It is significant to note that Hearts & Hands is an 
autocratically governed organization. While a Cabinet was made up of the Divisional CEO 
and the Secretaries of the various departments, only the CEO had any decision-making 
power. The remaining members of the Cabinet gave input to the decision-making process, but 
the ultimate decision always rested with the CEO.   
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Four defining features of the Hearts & Hands culture were identified in the course of the 
study. These were its mission, its funding arrangements, its personnel, and its outward-
looking philosophy of community engagement. All these had an impact on the way the 
organization managed the change from a cash-based to an accrual-based accounting system. 
The sense of mission within Hearts & Hands was very strong and well established, 
particularly amongst its ordained workers, but also amongst many others, including some 
employees who were also members of the Hearts & Hands church. Its 1996 Year Book 
described the mission as being “to preach the gospel of Jesus Christ and meet human needs in 
his name without discrimination”. Ordained personnel expressed an impressive commitment 
to this mission, working long hours, often under considerable pressure, to serve the public 
and to live up to the public’s expectations, of which they were acutely aware.  
The maintenance of funding levels to fulfil this mission was crucial to the ongoing successful 
operations of Hearts & Hands, which relied heavily on external sources of income. According 
to its 1997 financial statements, at the time of the study Hearts & Hands’ income came 
primarily from state and federal government grants, social services client contributions, and 
fundraising (see Table 1). An awareness of these dependencies permeated the organization. 
All personnel were very much aware of the need to attract Government grants, to raise funds 
successfully and to guard the public image of Hearts & Hands in order that future 
fundraising, and mission fulfilment, might continue unhampered. Together with its reliance 
on external funding and donations, went a well-established and documented system of 
internal accountability, based on a culture of good stewardship. Resources were to be used 
wisely and well, and a proper accounting provided in accordance with organizational 
expectations. External accountability was fulfilled by means of the annual report and audited 
financial statements, and there was a strong emphasis on operating within budgetary 
constraints. 
Income Category  1997 (%) 1996 (%) 1995 (%) 
Government Grants 29.9 32.2 29.6 
Fundraising 14.1 16.2 15.0 
Client Contributions 15.3 15.1 14.4 
Legacies and Donations 12.8 8.2 14.2 
Sales 11.0 11.6 10.1 
Interest and Dividends 7.6 5.2 4.8 
Other Income 9.3 11.5 11.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Table 1. Hearts & Hands Proportional Income 1995 - 1997                                            
(Source: Hearts & Hands Consolidated Financial Statements June 30 1996, 1997)  
Personnel issues emanated from Hearts & Hands’ hierarchical structure and its system of 
appointments, which perpetuated a strong distinction between ordained personnel and 
employees. Increasingly employees were performing tasks once done by ordained members. 
Figure 2 below illustrates the change in employment structure of Hearts & Hands, and 
demonstrates the dramatic increase in the number of employees, coinciding with a slight 
decrease in the number of ordained personnel.  
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Figure 2. Relative size of ordained and employee numbers, 1960 - 1995. 
(Source: Hearts & Hands’ Year Books 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995)   
These changes in personnel were already well under way when accrual accounting was 
introduced, and brought their own particular tensions. The ordained culture, based on a sense 
of calling and mission, was challenged by the employment of a greater number of 
professionals, particularly social workers and accounting personnel. Employees could never 
demonstrate the same level of commitment as ordained personnel, to organizational mission, 
and furthermore, were sometimes culturally a little out of place in a religious organization. 
The traditional practice of the organization was to appoint ordained members to accounting 
and management positions with little or no consultation, and little or no formal professional 
training. Appointments were for relatively short periods of time (one to three years), 
requiring appointees to do whatever was needed at the time.  
Although this was not a significant problem in accounting roles while Hearts & Hands 
employed a cash-based system, accrual accounting required more expertise, which was 
lacking in many staff. At the time of the study, Hearts & Hands had already adopted some 
new management accounting practices following a report by an external consultant, and had 
experienced a clash of cultures in that process. The preparation of acquittals for government 
grant purposes6 was becoming more complex and necessitating a more highly developed 
accounting skill set. In addition, the organization had recognized the need for an improved 
computerized accounting system. All these factors had contributed to the employment of a 
professionally qualified Chief Accountant.  
Some of the older ordained members saw these expectations and changes of position as 
positive, appreciating the variety of roles they had performed, from pastoral work to service 
centre management, accounting and administration. However, many of the younger ordained 
members were not as positive about the traditional system. They favoured a more 
consultative style of appointments, and a defined, specialised career path. In addition, the 
increasing accounting and reporting regulatory requirements, particularly in social centres, 
meant that ordained staff often struggled with acquiring the expertise necessary to perform 
their required tasks. These issues were a challenge to the “sink or swim” culture of 
appointments. One ordained manager of an aged care centre spoke very emotionally about his 
sense of inadequacy on his appointment directly from a local church situation, since he knew 
0
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nothing about government regulations, accounting requirements or the general running of 
aged care facilities.  
Another dominant feature of Hearts & Hands’ culture was its outward-looking, community 
focus. Advisory Boards, already mentioned, were recruited both at Divisional and Sub-
Divisional level. They consisted of high-profile business people who were able to provide 
advice about how Hearts & Hands should operate from a fund-raising, corporate perspective. 
Hearts & Hands personnel were used to being open to external influences, and this reliance 
on corporate expertise was well-established in the organizational structures. At the time of the 
study, Hearts & Hands was either undergoing or had recently undergone several 
consultancies, all focused on gaining greater efficiencies in its internal operations. 
Prior to its introduction of accrual accounting, Hearts & Hands’ accounting practice for many 
years had been cash based, fund accounting. It involved the separation of funds received, 
authorisation according to set hierarchical responsibilities, and accuracy in the recording and 
reporting of movements in and out of these funds. These were tasks that required no 
specialised accounting training, but simply an understanding of basic record keeping. The 
system was fairly unsophisticated, focussing on internal reporting requirements. 
Consequently, with the constant rotation of jobs, already highlighted, ordained members were 
required on occasions to take up accounting positions and discharge their duties as required. 
This was accomplished with varying levels of success. Following authority structures, and in 
keeping with the culture of the organization, the emphasis was on stringent adherence to rules 
and regulations that were established higher up the hierarchy. The assumption was that if 
these regulations were being fulfilled, then "proper" accounting would automatically follow.  
Up until, and including, the year ended 30 June 1994, the annual financial reports of Hearts & 
Hands included a Balance Sheet, Income and Expenditure Statement, and a Statement of the 
Movement in Reserves for each of its three funds, the Social Trust, the Property Fund, and 
the General Fund. The accounts were not consolidated, and a Statement of Cash Flows was 
not prepared. The financial statements were audited by a "Big Six" accounting firm7. They 
were produced, according to the Audit Report, for distribution to members of the 
organization, and were not to be relied upon by any person other than those within Hearts & 
Hands. The audit report was qualified, due to the impracticability of maintaining an effective 
system of internal control over donations until the point at which they were entered into the 
accounting records. In response to institutional influences emanating from the public sector, 
however, this system had already begun to change, with the employment of a number of 
professionally-trained accountants in Hearts & Hands’ internal audit section, and in its 
Finance Department, as indicated in Figure 1.  
In 1998, around the time this study was conducted, funds for Australian charities came 
primarily from government sources (40%), from fundraising, both individual and corporate 
(22%), bequests (7%), investments (3%), and the charging of fees and selling of assets (28%) 
(Philanthropy Australia, 2003). With cutbacks in government funding, charitable giving was 
experiencing financial pressure in an increasingly competitive funding environment, with the 
growing expectation that donations through fundraising ought to come from the business 
sector (Cleary, 1998). Consequently, in order to establish and maintain legitimacy as 
worthwhile recipients for charitable dollars, not-for-profit organizations like Hearts & Hands 
were adopting the structural forms and cultural practices not only of the government and the 
general public, but also of the corporate world (Irvine, 2000).   
The adoption of accrual accounting by the public sector, as part of a raft of new public 
management reforms, heralded “momentous” and controversial changes (Pilcher, 2005, p. 
174). Llewellyn and Milne (2007, p. 818) identified it as a political strategy, having a 
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“variable” impact on managers, depending on whether they accepted, attempted to evade, or 
worked to challenge the prevailing discourse. Because not-for-profit organizations, including 
Hearts & Hands, depend on funding from the public sector, they experience pressure to adopt 
the institutionalized values and practices of that sector (Lyons, 1997; Alexander and Weiner, 
1998; Irvine, 2000; Myers and Sacks, 2003; Dart, 2004). Subject to changing institutional 
expectations, including accounting control systems (Booth, 1995), the not-for-profit sector at 
the time of this study was already instituting changes that had occurred in the public sector. 
These created new corporatized practices and expectations that would inevitably have an 
impact on Hearts & Hands as it changed from cash-based accounting to accrual accounting.  
3. An expanded institutional framework for examining accounting change  
According to new institutional sociology, in adopting institutionally acceptable practices, 
organizations resemble each other both structurally and culturally in a process known as 
institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Dacin, 1997; Stout and Cormode, 
1998). If external coercive (regulatory), mimetic (the copying of successful organizations) or 
normative (the influence of professional groups)8 pressures lead to the adoption and 
implementation of institutionally legitimate practices, organizations face internal adjustments 
as existing structures, cultures and routines are displaced and reconstituted (Scott, 1995).   
As a consequence of its emphasis on institutional isomorphism, however, institutional theory 
stresses conformity, not diversity, in spite of the fact that organizations are unique and 
individual, and complex in their ways of learning and adopting new forms of organizing 
(Roberts and Greenwood, 1997). Case studies such as this enable insights into the variability 
of organizational responses to similar institutional environments (Zucker, 1991, p. 105). They 
reveal everyday organizational behaviour and the "concrete" ways in which institutionally 
desirable systems are embedded in organizational systems (Meyerson, 1994, p. 650).  
Factors that have been identified as working against a passive response to institutional 
pressures include resource dependencies (Oliver, 1991), functional complexity, technical 
uncertainty, organizational size (Ang and Cummings, 1997), the desire for organizational 
effectiveness, autonomy over decision making, flexibility, or satisfying conflicting internal 
demands (Townley, 1997), and a perception that in a religious organization, accounting 
should be resisted because of its “secular” nature (Laughlin, 1988; Laughlin, 1990; Booth, 
1993; Booth, 1995; Lightbody, 2000).9 These factors will inevitably affect the response that 
organizational decision-makers have to institutional expectations. Once the decision to adopt 
an institutionally desirable practice is made, then organizational actors respond. The 
organization’s unique structure, culture and routines inevitably affect the formulation of 
rules, and the implementation of and responses to those rules. This raises the possibility of 
questioning and resistance to the adoption of practices that do not fit in with these 
organizational realities.   
The "old" institutionalism, or old institutional economics, in emphasising the unique internal 
processes by which institutional practices are embedded in organizational routines, does not 
assume that organizations automatically display "inertia, persistence, and conformity" 
(Kraatz and Zajac, 1996, p. 833). Burns and Scapens (2000, p. 7) employed old institutional 
economics concepts to identify a number of processes whereby management accounting 
practice became institutionalized, i.e. became “a way of thought or action of some prevalence 
and permanence, which is embedded in the habits of a group or the customs of a people”. 
Rather than conceptualizing institutionalization as a state, they identified it as the process of 
encoding, enacting, reproducing and eventually institutionalizing formalised rules into 
procedural or taken-for-granted routines (see Figure 3 for a diagrammatic interpretation of 
these stages).  
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The encoding process involves the translation of existing institutional behaviours into a 
system of rules. The enactment of rules and routines calls for a response from organizational 
actors, who may resist the new rules if they are capable of doing so, i.e. if they have the 
resources or power necessary to make such a response (Burns and Scapens, 2000, p. 10). 
Next comes the reproduction of the encoded rules as behaviour in either the same or revised 
form. Revisions to the new rules may be either conscious if actors have access to power and 
resources, or unconscious, particularly if there are no formal monitoring systems to check the 
manner of implementation, or if implementers are not conversant with what is required of 
them (Burns and Scapens, 2000). The process of institutionalization has occurred when the 
new rules and routines take on a “normative and factual quality”, so that they are taken-for-
granted and not connected with the various interests of organizational actors (Burns and 
Scapens, 2000, p. 11). Once this has occurred, the process continues into further iterations as 
new institutionally acceptable practices are introduced in a constantly evolving process.  
This model of the process of change, however, is primarily intra-organizational, giving little 
consideration to the manner in which the new practice breaks into existing organizational 
arrangements. Since organizations are situated in society and dependent on that society, and 
the organizational tendency is to inertia, according to Broadbent and Laughlin (2005, p. 9), an 
initial “kick” will likely stimulate change, which could take a number of paths as it tracks 
through the organization. This “kick” could come from outside or inside (Laughlin, 1991), as 
a management response, for example, to an external cash flow problem (Siti-Nabiha and 
Scapens, 2005), or as an organizational response to external pressures (Rautiainen, 2008; 
West and Carnegie, 2010). The adoption of accrual accounting could be identified as such as 
“kick”. Thus given an external institutional pressure, organizational actors are in a position to 
develop a consciousness of the need to change (Burns, 2000), and to make a decision about 
whether a new practice is going to be adopted. This deciding process, if added to Burns and 
Scapens’ (2000) four change processes, would enable an analysis of the full gamut of the 
change process, incorporating an acknowledgement of the new institutional sociology 
pressures identified by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) with the strengths of the old institutional 
economics focus on the internal workings of the change process. These change processes are 
portrayed in Figure 3 as emanating from the institutional environment, and eventually 
permeating to the core of the organization in a five staged process.  
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Figure 3. Five stages of organizational change (adapted from concepts in Burns and 
Scapens, 2000) 
Another deficiency of institutional theory is the dearth of consideration given to the role of 
politics and power in organizations (Dillard et al., 2004). Consistent with the understanding 
of institutionalization as a complex and dynamic process of change, Burns (2000) identified 
politics and the mobilisation of power as central to the change process. Political activities 
could be undertaken by organizational actors both externally and internally in the process of 
organizational change, at a variety of positions in the hierarchy, and could result in resistance 
or conflict (Burns, 2000). Decisions about whether to adopt institutionally acceptable 
practices that emerge as pressures from the external environment could be politically 
negotiated, as could the process whereby new systems are encoded, enacted and reproduced. 
Similarly, power over resources, decision-making and meanings could be exercised 
throughout the change process (Burns, 2000), inevitably disturbing existing roles and 
relationships. They can create conflict or tension, as in the case of the development of new 
roles for management accountants (Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005), and involve the 
“unlearning” of existing habits, which creates anxiety and a need for trust in the process of 
change (Busco et al., 2006, p. 28).  
The process of institutionalization that results in new rules becoming taken-for-granted and 
unquestioningly accepted is unlikely to be achieved unless these power dynamics are 
managed carefully. In a study of imposed accounting change in a UK chemical manufacturer, 
Burns (2000, p. 591) concluded that, “despite all the political manoeuvres, and extensive 
mobilisation of power, [the organization] still maintained its traditional ways of thinking”, 
with the result that norms and values remained stable. Such a failure to take into account the 
attitudes and abilities of organizational members may lead to a merely superficial adoption of 
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new practices, so that the routines enacted and reproduced are different from the rules 
encoded. This decoupling means that the image obtained by having an encoded system does 
not correspond with the actual enactment (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 
1988; Fogarty, 1992; Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005; West and Carnegie, 2010). Given that 
an organization responds to an institutional pressure by making the decision to adopt a 
particular practice, if the technical process of embedding that change does not meet the 
expectations of organizational members, or those actors are not capable of activating the 
change, there could be conflict or dissatisfaction. The result could be that the technical 
embedding of the practice will not achieve the requirements laid out in the formal policy. 
It has been suggested that in a highly institutionalized environment, organizations conform by 
focusing primarily on managing their external reputation, through the expression of a logic of 
confidence, or image projection, in which they represent themselves as institutionally 
conformist (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Fogarty, 1992; Fogarty, 1996; Rollins and Bremser, 
1997; Fogarty and Rogers, 2005; Richardson and Kilfoyle, 2009)10. This organizational self-
promotion can take on a greater importance than the actual management of the internal 
relationships involved in adopting the practice (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). This, in turn, could 
lead to conflict between those who are promoting the image and those who are charged with 
the responsibility of embedding the new practice. Further, since close inspection may reveal 
discrepancies between stated practice and actual implementation that would threaten 
organizational image, the system of inspection and evaluation is likely to be minimized or 
ceremonialized (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Once organizational constituents have agreed on 
the importance of promoting the right image, the examination of work can be substituted for 
an assessment of its actual results (Fogarty and Rogers, 2005), i.e. its technical benefits or 
efficiencies. Thus if the image-producing benefits of a new practice are prioritized by one 
group of constituents, while the technical benefits are prioritized by another group, this also 
could lead to conflict or tension.  
The manner or extent to which these tensions occur will vary from organization to 
organization. There may be deliberate manipulation of image, as in the case of managers who 
hid behind a “facade of acquiescence” while not actually activating change as required, when 
they experienced the imposition of forced accounting change (Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005, 
p. 62).  Or, faced with the need to present an image of conformity, organizations may struggle 
to make a new practice work in a technical sense, achieving varying levels of conformity 
between the image and the reality   (Orton and Weick, 1990; Fogarty and Rogers, 2005; 
Busco et al., 2006; Lukka, 2007).   
Hearts and Hands’ management of the change to accrual accounting 
Hearts & Hands’ first set of consolidated financial statements, produced for the year ended 30 
June 1995, provide an interesting window into the early stages of its adoption of accrual 
accounting. In that year, depreciation on additions to freehold buildings was included for the 
first time. In that set of financials there was a statement by the trustees, signed by Barry, the 
Secretary of Finance, that the accounts presented a true and fair view of the results and cash 
flows for the year, and that they had been drawn up in accordance with applicable Australian 
accounting standards. The independent audit report was qualified as it had been in earlier 
years, but this time it highlighted the adherence to accounting standards and other mandatory 
professional reporting requirements. These statements were a powerful image enhancer.   
This image was important, because the 1995 financial statements were more overtly designed 
for distribution to the general public, including the corporate world, and to prompt a response 
in the form of donations11. Also for the first time, the financial statements included a letter 
from the Hearts & Hands CEO, addressed to supporters and friends. The letter highlighted the 
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social needs Hearts & Hands was meeting, thanked friends for their support, and included an 
appeal for more help in the raising of funds for the work. The financial statements exceeded 
the legal requirements under which Hearts & Hands operated, since accrual accounting was 
not mandatory at that time. They also went further than merely deflecting any potential 
criticism of Hearts & Hands' financial practices12. As with other organizations in the not-for-
profit field that had already moved in this direction, this voluntary higher standard of 
reporting moved Hearts & Hands quite definitely into the corporate arena, and provided a 
more corporate image.  From this point onwards, the organization worked at the challenging 
process of implementing a complete accrual accounting system.  
The institutional process of accrual accounting adoption portrayed in Figure 3, forms the 
framework by which Hearts and Hands’ adoption of accrual accounting is now analysed. 
Case study material is organized under five identified processes of institutionalization (based 
on Burns and Scapens, 2000), giving consideration also to any evidence of external 
institutional pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), the political and power dynamics of 
change (Burns, 2000), and the relationship between the image of accrual accounting and 
technical realities of its adoption.  
Deciding – the move to accrual accounting 
Understanding why the decision was made to change from a cash-based to an accruals-based 
accounting system involves a consideration of both the institutional environment in which 
Hearts & Hands operated, and also the intricacies of its own internal decision making 
structures and culture, both of which have been outlined. While Barry, the Secretary of 
Finance, had no problems with the decision to adopt accrual accounting, being a former 
Chartered Accountant himself, he nevertheless expressed frustration at this decision-making 
process, particularly in relation to financial matters: 
And the [CEO] says okay, we’re going to do this, and you say, well – 
you say to yourself, who wants this, why are we doing it? Is this 
something the [CEO’s] got, a pet thing that he wants to do, or has in 
fact the Cabinet got together and said yeah, that’s a great idea, the 
Division ought to be doing it, get on and do it? 
The lack of consultation, while frustrating on occasions, probably streamlined the decision to 
adopt accrual accounting, which was undoubtedly strongly influenced by Joe, the Head of 
Business Administration. He had experience of implementing accrual accounting in Hearts & 
Hands in the USA. In a meeting at the start of the project, he described how not-for-profit 
organizations there had been dragged "kicking and screaming" into the accrual accounting 
arena. The "fairly simple" cash based system that Hearts & Hands used belonged to an earlier 
era, he said, whereas now greater complexity was part of “a change in the function of 
society”.   
Several factors can be identified as contributing to the decision. The public sector’s adoption 
of accrual accounting, already highlighted, had an indirect coercive impact, since accrual 
accounting was required for various reports necessary for government grants. According to 
one Hearts & Hands social employee, accrual accounting had “just appeared” in government 
contracts, not across the board, but here and there13. While there appeared, initially, to be no 
overall government policy, it was acknowledged that accrual accounting was the "trend", 
with most similar organizations moving in that direction, hence there was a strong mimetic 
pressure to adopt it.  
The accounting profession was already foreshadowing the mandatory adoption of accrual 
accounting by not-for-profits, and so it was in the interests of Hearts & Hands to respond to 
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this strong normative pressure. Hearts & Hands’ production of consolidated accounts that 
were consistent with accounting standards was another response to a growing trend within 
society for non-corporate organizations to adopt corporate-style accounts. The Government, a 
major funder of Hearts & Hands, had already moved to adopt accrual accounting. The 
appointment of Stuart, a professionally qualified accountant, as Hearts & Hands’ Chief 
Accountant, rather than a Hearts & Hands’ ordained worker, further committed the 
organization to the decision.   
Hearts & Hands’ culture of openness to corporate influences had already resulted in 
significant changes in the two years prior to this study, as a result of advice from External 
Advisory Board members and external consultants. Prior to and concurrent with this study, 
the organization had undergone a series of changes, including an organizational restructure, 
the employment of a greater number of accounting professionals, the introduction of a global 
budgeting system, the commissioning of several management consulting studies, and a 
reassessment of the computerised accounting system. The adoption of accrual accounting 
represented a further step in this progression towards a more corporate mode of operations, 
and an increasing emphasis on operating in a business-like manner.   
Resource dependencies enhanced Hearts & Hands’ leaders’ awareness that an institutionally 
acceptable image should be maintained if the organization were to appear legitimate to those 
on whom it relied for funding, specifically the government, corporations and the general 
public.  In relation to financial matters, that image was to be fiscally responsible and 
corporate, with the adoption of accrual accounting contributing to that image. There was an 
acknowledgment from people within the organization that over the three years portrayed in 
Table 1, raising money from the public had become more difficult. Government funding was 
scarcer, being increasingly linked to restrictive requirements. As Barry, the Secretary of 
Finance, observed  
… we’ve got to [run as a business]. The business side of it, we’ve got 
to be pretty professional. If you call that running a business, it’s fund 
raising. If you don’t do it properly, you just don’t get the money. 
There are a lot of other charities around. 
Also related to funding was the government’s cutback in the funding of capital works 
programs for charitable organizations. Where once the government could be relied upon to 
provide funds towards the replacement of buildings, this was no longer the case, and there 
was a need for Hearts & Hands to set aside its own funds for building replacement. Stuart, the 
Chief Accountant, stated at a training day for social centre finance staff in 1997, that over the 
next few years, $200 million of assets would need to be replaced. The establishment of Asset 
Replacement Trusts, based on depreciation calculations, was vital to the continuation of 
Hearts & Hands' mission. There was thus not only an image requirement, but also a technical 
benefit expected from the adoption of accrual accounting. The potential conflict between the 
image and the technical application would have to be balanced as the adoption process 
progressed.  
The decision was therefore made at the top levels of the organization, in a politically astute 
manner, as a response to a barrage of institutional pressures and the desire to present an 
image consistent with the corporate world. However, this adoption decision heralded a 
process that would be fraught at many levels, not just because it was a major change, but 
because of the unique nature of the organization and its hierarchical structure, entrenched 
autocratic culture and lack of accounting trained personnel.  
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Encoding - designing new systems and training personnel 
The encoding process, by which a formal set of rules was developed (Burns and Scapens, 
2000), was conducted in a top-down approach that was somewhat haphazard. While Joe, as 
head of Business Administration, was ultimately responsible, Barry, as Secretary of Finance, 
oversaw the actual implementation, which was operationalized by Stuart, the Chief 
Accountant. Its implementation depended on other Hearts & Hands’ staff in the Finance 
Department, and the managers and accountants/bookkeepers at the various centres.  
The move to accrual accounting was encoded explicitly when, in a set of guidelines to social 
centre managers about their budgets for 1996/97, accrual accounting was established as the 
"basis for budgeting". Stuart formulated a brief explanation of depreciation:  
Accrual accounting is to be used as a basis for budgeting. It needs to 
be noted that accruals for leave liabilities need to be accounted for in 
the budget. The cost associated with using any durable asset is termed 
"Depreciation", an item of expense to be accounted for. Assets over 
$500 need to be capitalised and depreciated accordingly.14  
At an accrual accounting training day for bookkeepers and managers of social centres in 
1997, Stuart explained this policy in more detail. Although his audience was made up of 
people who were directly working on the financial aspects of the centres, he overestimated 
their accounting knowledge. He asserted that to expense assets over $500 was "morally and 
ethically wrong" now that the accounts were presented as annual reports and the auditors had 
to sign to say they gave a "true and fair view". On that occasion, the lack of understanding of 
basic accounting concepts demonstrated by attendees at the training workshop was startlingly 
evident. Coming as he did from a corporate situation, Stuart was unprepared for the financial 
incompetence he observed in some social centre managers: 
One [attitude towards finance] is one of sheer ignorance, that they just 
don’t know what they’re doing, and they’ve done their best to put a 
budget together, but they don’t know how, or what they’re doing.  
Joe also acknowledged this lack of expertise, observing that accountants, or those with 
analytical skills, were “not the people who are most necessarily often found in the ranks of 
[Hearts & Hands]”. Thus for a variety of reasons, including misperceptions of the existing 
financial expertise of social centre bookkeepers and managers, the Finance Department 
did not encode clear and unambiguous guidance for the implementation of accrual 
accounting.  
This was revealed in a report prepared for Divisional Head Office leaders. Stimulated by the 
anticipated “Year 2000” computer problem, but also by a raft of underlying frustrations and 
complaints, in 1997 Hearts & Hands commissioned a leading firm of chartered accountants to 
provide a review of its outdated computerised accounting system. In their report the 
consultants highlighted the negative impact of the adoption of accrual accounting on Hearts 
& Hands. The report stated that most centre staff and divisional staff could not cope either 
with the accrual accounting system or with the accounting issues surrounding transactions. 
This impacted negatively, they stated, on the quality of the financial information the 
accounting system produced. The reasons they identified for these problems were that 
accounting policies and procedures were not well developed, nor issues understood; there 
was an absence of clear and useful accounting instructions from head office, which led to 
confusion in processing transactions; training was inadequate; and bottlenecks occurred in the 
process because not all staff knew how to deal with the accrual accounting system. The 
technical aspects of the adoption of accrual accounting were simply not being achieved, 
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which led to a separation between the official rules and the actual routines that were being 
operationalized. This was an uncomfortable situation for Stuart, who saw his role as being “to 
preserve and enhance the financial integrity of [Hearts & Hands] by bringing them to account 
a little bit better than they are at the moment”.  
The findings of this report on Hearts & Hands’ computerized accounting system were 
reinforced by a report by a firm of external consultants who were engaged specifically to 
assess the accrual accounting adoption process. After two years, they found, changes had not 
been implemented "completely and effectively", with the result that Hearts & Hands was 
operating in a "half-way situation between cash and accrual accounting". Many managers and 
many accounting personnel, they observed, were confused about the relationship between 
accrual and cash-based figures. Undoubtedly part of this confusion emanated from a lack of 
expertise, but it also resulted from a lack of clarity in the encoding of the new system and 
insufficient training for staff. The result was a disparity between the image portrayed by the 
adoption of accrual accounting and its actual technical implementation, and a tension 
between those at varying levels of the hierarchy.  
As Stuart became more aware of the lack of financial expertise in the sub-divisions and social 
centres, he came to see the benefits of providing clear rules and directions to staff on 
financial matters. He related the request of a Secretary of Finance from one of the sub-
divisions, for some suggestions about what he should do in his role. This was a revealing 
request, and one Stuart was happy to respond to: 
So we wrote back and gave him a few bullet points, just ten or twelve 
items, and it was very helpful, and we think we may have that as a 
standard document to give to the other [sub-divisional] financial 
secretaries, and say this is the expectations … I wasn’t aware that 
they weren’t aware of what they were meant to be doing. So 
obviously, in the past, they’ve been appointed to these positions.  
There’s been no procedural manuals or operational manuals, or 
whatever, sort of guiding instructions as to what to look for.  It was 
sort of assumed that vague terms like “monitor the centre’s variance 
report” or something, but it just didn’t say how, or what to look for, 
and what amounts or what differences, and so on, and how to follow 
it up.     
Once the decision to adopt accrual accounting was made, its implementation was presented, 
initially, as a matter of relative simplicity. The encoding process was in keeping with the 
manner in which organizational change had been managed in the past, i.e. in an autocratic, 
top-down approach. One sub-divisional officer observed that the top management failed to 
“read” the situation, expecting more of ordained members and employees than they were 
capable of performing, and interpreting the behaviour of some managers as wilful disregard 
for accounting deadlines. Coupled with this was the fact that with the locus of power being 
almost entirely at the Divisional Head Office, insufficient resources were released for the 
management of the change process15.  
Enacting and reproducing - implementing and refining the changes 
The enacting and reproducing processes are iterative and difficult to separate. As 
organizational actors encode new rules, they may meet with resistance, which can be 
conscious or unconscious, as they come to terms with what is required. Thus while there was 
an acknowledgment among organization members who understood government funding 
requirements and accounting, that the introduction of accrual accounting was an inevitable 
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undertaking, response within Hearts & Hands to its adoption was mixed. One social officer 
described it as "a good way to go", and another finance employee as "a good move", 
indicating their agreement with the promoted benefits of accrual accounting16. Joe 
acknowledged that accounting had “gotten so much more complex” with the adoption of 
accrual accounting. Another social employee, who was studying accounting, described the 
shift to accrual accounting as "terrific", because what she was learning, she could now put 
into practice. 
These positive responses to the changes, however, were almost entirely from those who had 
some sort of financial expertise or accounting training. One Divisional Head Office employee 
described the difficulty that many people had with the adoption of accrual accounting, and 
with the dearth of training that was provided: 
… we've gone from cash accounting, manual books, to computerised 
accrual accounting. Well, two jumps, computers and accrual 
accounting. And not everyone is qualified, either formally or 
informally, to deal with that. So that's something we must address, 
and as part of our work, just in the few instances that I've been 
involved with, we have addressed that. Training is something that 
simply must be done.  
Other Hearts & Hands staff described accrual accounting as “much more technically 
demanding”, “just impossible”, “not very clear”, “confusing”, “much more complex” and 
“requiring additional supervision”. These were all responses that reflected a lack of 
knowledge and expertise, as well as unclear encoding of the new system and an inadequate 
provision for training and supervision. Personnel issues became more intense as accrual 
accounting was adopted. Because of their budgetary constraints, one of the difficulties Hearts 
& Hands faced was that they tended to employ people described by one head office 
employee, as being from "the bottom end of the market", with salaries that reflected this. This 
meant that with the introduction of accrual accounting, even the accountants/bookkeepers at 
the social centres were unable to cope with the new system without additional training or 
resources. Feelings about this ran very deeply, with many of the staff upset by the way the 
process was managed. They struggled with the new system, and at some centres, according to 
one ordained social centre manager, there were employees who "panicked and left because 
they couldn't cope with accrual accounting".  
The result was that at every level of the organization, the gap between accountants and non-
accountants was startlingly obvious. The image of Hearts & Hands as an implementer of a 
high quality accrual accounting system was therefore very different from the technical reality. 
Even at the top levels of the hierarchy, organization members were having difficulty making 
decisions about matters that required an understanding of accrual accounting. Top ranking 
members in most cases had come through Hearts & Hands in the days of the cash system, and 
accrual accounting was entirely new to them as well. At one head office Budget meeting, in 
the context of approving budgets for new capital items, Stuart explained to the meeting that 
there was a "lag" between the cash and accrual systems, that the changeover was "evolving", 
and that policies and procedures were overlaying practice. This was a huge undertaking 
according to one Divisional Head Office employee:  
… while the cashbooks were manual, and you could see literally on 
the page what you were doing, you didn't need to know debits and 
credits. Now that we have accrual accounting, and it's computerised, 
you need to know debits and credits, and I did explain to one person 
what journals were. They weren't aware of that. Now they could do 
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their bookwork, fine, but they weren't aware of the reason for the 
accounting side of it, or how the accounting side worked. So that's a 
culture change, as much as anything.  
Faced with a situation where the image and the technical reality and expected technical 
benefits of accrual accounting were not matching up, Stuart worked hard to ensure that 
technical practice was accurate and effective. The "lag" in the adoption of accrual accounting 
resulted in huge frustrations with the consolidation process as well. It was slow and unwieldy, 
and Finance Department staff, particularly those who were trained accountants, experienced a 
great deal of frustration. They complained that accounting information that was unreliable, 
inaccurate and late was transmitted to them from various centres. Stuart, who had formerly 
worked for a large multinational company, felt this pressure, since his professional reputation 
was involved. To his frustration, the production of fully audited accounts within three weeks 
of the end of the financial year, which had happened in his previous employment, simply did 
not happen at Hearts & Hands. One ordained member from head office expressed discontent 
that the financial reports for the 30 June one year came out in April of the following year. 
"It's crazy," he said, "but on the other hand, who cares? Nobody seemed to be worried about 
it". There appeared to be no real requirement that just because accrual accounting had been 
adopted, with its image-enhancing benefits, annual reports needed to be produced in a more 
timely manner.  
Corporate-style reporting had been adopted, but Hearts & Hands was simply not a corporate-
style organization, and required people with a different type of approach, according to a 
Divisional Head Office employee: 
… it's no good putting (ordained members) there just to give them a 
job … [Hearts & Hands] is too big now. The world's - we're too 
commercial. We've just got to fit in with things. We've got to have the 
right sort of people.  
This recognition, sensible from a business viewpoint, conflicted with the views of many of 
the ordained members of Hearts & Hands. One area in which this was evident was in the 
employment of professional accountants. The head of the internal audit department at the 
time was not the first professional accountant to be employed in this position, but his 
presence in this role occasioned some negative feedback, as expressed by a non-ordained 
internal audit employee who was a member of a Hearts & Hands church. He wanted the task 
of accounting to be accomplished in a manner consistent with the organization’s values: 
… professionally, probably quite sound, and I can see they're trying to 
work in with Hearts & Hands' philosophy, but sometimes the 
attitudes, the phraseology, the language, belies their suitability. It 
goes beyond true professional ability … but if we carry that through, 
and just simply select people because they're good at performing the 
basic tasks of their position and they don't have a very strong affinity 
with Hearts & Hands, and are not keen on promoting its cause 
through their lives, sure, our image will drop.  
The processes of enacting and reproducing accrual accounting within Hearts & Hands, thus 
caused conflict between the leaders who made the adoption decision, the Finance Department 
staff who were responsible for the implementation of accrual accounting, and the personnel, 
both ordained and professional, who enacted and reproduced those rules.     
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Institutionalizing - taken-for-granted accrual accounting  
The adoption of what was essentially a corporate-style accounting practice by a not-for-profit 
organization, and the process by which it became institutionalized, or taken-for-granted, can 
thus be seen as an ongoing, intricate and complex process that can precipitate conflict 
between the various actors involved, particularly if it is not managed well. Many of the 
aspects of this process were puzzling to an outsider, but more understandable once Hearts & 
Hands’ internal dynamics were studied.  
Why did the Finance Department, specifically Barry, fail to allocate sufficient resources to 
the project, even cancelling training that had been commenced? Barry himself had expressed 
the opinion that orders were to be obeyed. This view, coupled with a lack of acknowledgment 
of the poor accounting skills of many of the staff, combined to produce tension and conflict 
between the hierarchy who had decided to adopt accrual accounting, the department charged 
with the responsibility for implementing it, and the people (employees and ordained) with 
whom they had to work. Why was it assumed that the new system, once announced, would 
simply be adopted? Structurally and culturally, Hearts & Hands had always operated with a 
“sink or swim” culture, and the expectation was that commands would be obeyed and people 
would simply get on with the task. This had been the approach in the past. Accrual 
accounting, however, proved to be more difficult, and challenged established structures, 
culture and routines. Why was there a sense of competition between the Divisional Head 
office and the various sub-divisional offices? With the hierarchical structure and autocratic 
culture established, a system of command and obedience entrenched, and power over 
decisions and resources concentrated at the top of the organization, those lower down the 
hierarchy had little recourse to alternatives or resources. The Chief Accountant was caught 
between the upper and lower hierarchy, and was responsible for the implementation process. 
He found himself the frustrated player in a structure where decision-makers were accustomed 
to obedience and those who had to work with accrual accounting were incapable of obeying.  
Why was there a sense of unease between professional accountants and other organization 
members? The Chief Accountant and other professional accountants were frustrated by the 
lack of accounting ability of many of the Hearts & Hands employees who were supposed to 
be performing accounting roles. This was the case for both ordained people and employees, 
most of whom had no formal accounting training. The difficulties in implementing accrual 
accounting, and the ongoing problems Hearts & Hands experienced, emanated from a clash 
between its own institutionalized ways of doing things, carried by ordained staff, and the 
changes required to implement the new accounting system, carried by professional 
accounting employees.    
Applying Hearts & Hands’ adoption and implementation of accrual accounting to Figure 3, 
the institutional environment exerted pressure on Hearts & Hands to adopt accrual 
accounting. Coercive institutional pressures emanated from government funding 
requirements. Mimetic pressures are illustrated by Hearts & Hands’ desire to produce 
financial reports in keeping with those of corporate entities and other not-for-profit 
organizations, while normative influences are evident in the influence of the professional 
accountants employed by Hearts & Hands. The external political awareness of senior 
executives was acute in discerning the need to conform to external institutional pressures, and 
to promote an enhanced image with the adoption of accrual accounting. However internally 
the decision makers and implementers failed to read the organization and to apply needed 
resources.  
The result was that the accrual accounting system as it was portrayed was different from the 
actual system that operated. This frustrated all staff. Senior ordained people such as Joe and 
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Barry expected those further down the hierarchy to be diligent and thorough in their 
implementation of new policies. Professional accounting staff like Stuart expected accrual 
accounting to be implemented efficiently and provide technical benefits. Many ordained staff 
struggled with the transition because they did not possess the necessary skills and at times 
questioned the appropriateness of professional staff. Employees who were not qualified 
accountants also needed more clarity about the new procedures and training in how to 
implement them. The energy required to institutionalize such a change was huge, and to 
maintain it required a continuing expenditure of effort, as entrenched practices threatened to 
swamp the new system.  
Conclusion 
This paper examined the process of change in a not-for-profit organization from an 
institutional perspective. Specifically, it identified and explicated five processes by which a 
new institutional practice, accrual accounting, was embedded in Hearts & Hands’ internal 
structures and routines. It recognized the conflict that accompanied that change, and the 
tension between the image of accrual accounting and the reality behind that image.  
The decision to adopt accrual accounting was made by Hearts & Hands’ leaders who were 
alert to institutional pressures to conform with the practice of the private and public sectors, 
on both of which Hearts & Hands depended for resources. Internally, the change process was 
poorly managed, setting up conflicts between various organizational members. Due to an 
entrenched autocratic, hierarchical structure, those who held power made assumptions about 
the way the change process ought to be managed, and allocated insufficient resources to 
training and implementation.  
Consequently, the encoding of the new system was ambiguous and incomplete, and failed to 
take into account the limited accounting abilities of many of the staff. It was therefore 
inevitable that the enactment and reproduction of the new system would be only partially 
successful, with frustrations experienced by all staff at all levels and between staff at all 
levels. While financial reports presented an image of an effective accrual accounting system, 
the behind the scenes reality was very different from this image. Professional accounting staff 
who were responsible for enacting the change were not content with this outcome, and 
worked to produce a system that functioned and was reproduced in the way it was supposed 
to.  Institutionalization occurred eventually, but only after a reassessment by management of 
the necessity of releasing additional resources to the management of the adoption process.  
The paper makes two contributions. First, it is a study of a not-for-profit organization that 
operates in an economically and socially significant sector that was undergoing rapid change. 
Expectations of what constitutes institutionally acceptable behaviour for not-for-profits have 
risen dramatically in the last few decades, including the level of accounting 
professionalization expected. These expectations bring a requirement for ongoing changes. 
The perspective of a single organization offers insights not available in a sector-wide study, 
and a heightened appreciation of practice. Secondly, the application of an expanded 
institutional framework enables the complex and problematic nature of the process of 
institutionalization to be unpacked in a specific organizational context by focusing on the 
conflict that arose as various organizational members tried to match the level of technical 
adoption of accrual accounting with the enhanced image it provided.  
While this paper does cover only one case, and its findings are not claimed to be 
generalizable, nevertheless it does provide broader insights about the process of 
institutionalization, combining a recognition of both the influence of external institutional 
factors and internal dynamics through the institutionalization process. Future research could 
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focus on other situations where, given times of change and uncertainty, an organization may 
adopt new accounting practices in order to conform to institutional practices and thereby 
enhance its image. Particularly in the case of not-for-profit organizations with a strong 
mission focus, operating as they do within uncertain financial parameters, further studies 
could be conducted on the legitimizing role of accounting and financial statements, on the 
relationship between accounting and fundraising, and on the dynamics of the 
professionalization of accounting.  
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1 The economic significance of the not-for-profit sector is considerable. The Johns Hopkins Comparative 
Nonprofit Sector Project reported that, in 1995, at the time of this study, the sector spent $US1.1 trillion across 
22 countries, an amount so large that if the sector were a country in its own right, it would have been the eighth 
largest world economy (Salamon and Anheier, 1999, p 2).  
2 These include quantitative and qualitative studies (see Myers and Sacks, 2003; Torres and Pina, 2003; Siti-
Nabiha and Scapens, 2005; Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005) conducted at both macro and micro levels (Vakkuri, 
2003). 
3 These include, but are not limited to, management (Maguire and Hardy, 2009), organization studies (Josserand 
et al., 2006), marketing  (Eikenberry and Kluver, 2004; Dolnicar et al., 2008), and accounting (Broadbent and 
Laughlin, 1998). Sectoral issues have been studied in the private (Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005; Busco et al., 
2006), public (Hoque and Moll, 2001; Hoque, 2005) and not-for-profit sectors (Alexander, 2000; Flack and 
Ryan, 2005). 
4 The name Hearts & Hands and other names relating to the case, are all pseudonyms.  
5 Hearts & Hands is part of the sector known variously as the “not-for-profit”, “voluntary”, “nonprofit” or 
“third” sector. It has been identified as diverse, complex and inter-related (Torres and Pina, 2003). The United 
Nations’ (2006) International Classification of Nonprofit Organizations identifies 12 primary not-for-profit 
groupings. “Social services”, “international” and “religion” comprise three of these groups (United Nations, 
2006, pp. 3 - 5).  
6 An “acquittal” is the final certification by the grant recipient that the grant funding has been expended in 
accordance with the terms and conditions of the funding agreement.  
7 At the time, these were Arthur Andersen, Coopers & Lybrand, KPMG, Deloitte & Touche, Price Waterhouse 
and Ernst & Young. 
8 Professional work has been identified as being surrounded by institutionalized expectations, rather than simply 
a “neutral or technical exercise” (Fogarty and Rogers, 2005, p. 337).  
9 While this has been questioned and debated as being not necessarily the case in all religious organizations 
(Jacobs and Walker, 2004; Irvine, 2002; Irvine, 2005), nevertheless the notion raises the issue that automatic 
and total conformity to institutional expectations cannot be assumed. Within individual organizations there is a 
culture and a belief system that causes members to question and resist the adoption of practices that do not fit in 
with the organization’s mission and belief system. 
10 Image can  be enhanced with  the use of “brand name auditors” (Rollins and Bremser, 1997, p. 204).  
11 This emphasis continued, with Stuart, the Chief Accountant, revealing that in the following year, 5,000 copies 
of the financial statements were produced, as compared with the 500 copies that had been published the year 
before. It was, he acknowledged, an exercise designed to attract corporate sponsorship.  
12 While there had not been any financial scandals, senior organizational members were sensitive about the 
issue, and acutely aware of their dependence, for fundraising purposes, on the donations and goodwill of the 
public. 
13 In the audited returns the government required from aged care centres, for example, salaries and wages had to 
be shown for 365 days, so accruals had to be calculated. 
14 Hearts & Hands adopted a system where depreciation was not only charged as an expense, but the various 
centres were required to set aside cash funds equal to the amount of the depreciation charge, in order to provide 
a fund for building replacement. These funds were lodged with Hearts & Hands' head office.  
15 One employee spoke positively of the training that had begun initially, but said it was discontinued, on the 
advice of Barry. Barry was reported to have described the transition to accrual accounting as a problem for the 
ordained members and staff who were implementing it, and not his problem, and as a result recommended that 
the training program be stopped. This attitude was consistent with the entrenched autocratic, hierarchical 
culture, where the top drove the organization and those at the bottom of the hierarchy simply toed the line and 
did what was expected of them, with little support or training, and certainly no complaints.  
16 Previously, the finance employee said, the attitude of the divisions and the centres under the cash-based 
system had been to spend, spend, spend, and get the head office to bail them out. This system did not provide a 
full picture of the cost of running centres, but under accrual accounting, these costs were determined, and centre 
managers were forced to make provisions for the future. 
